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The Law to Govern Deepsea Mining Until
Superseded by International Agreement
JOHN G. LAYLIN*
At present there is no international law, conventional or cus-
tomary, limiting the freedom to recover the mineral resources of
the seabed beyond coastal state jurisdiction,' nor is there yet any
United States statutory or common law limitation. A United
States company may invest millions of dollars finding deposits of
manganese nodules and millions more in setting up mining systems
and treatment plants adapted to the characteristics of the nodules
in this location, only to see others in the exercise of their freedom
rushing in and taking the nodules it counted on mining. The United
States has no right to legislate against such encroachment by per-
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1. Other than the obligation that this freedom "shall be exercised by
all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their
exercise of the freedom of the high seas." Convention on the High Seas,
signed 29 April 1958, effective 30 September 1962.
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sons not subject to its jurisdiction, but it can limit the right of its
citizens from taking advantage of the investments in prospecting
made by others. It further can, by legislation, regulate the deep
seabed mining by all United States citizens or companies to promote
conservation and orderly development of the hard mineral resources
of the deep seabed, pending adoption of an international regime
under the multilateral convention that the U.N. Seabed Committee
is seeking to bring about.
If it were possible to achieve international regulation pursuant to
a multinational convention before mining operations begin, national
legislation to regulate the activities of United States companies
would not be necessary. The technique for arriving at broad-based
international agreement unfortunately is not keeping pace with that
for engaging in deep seabed mining. This is not to say that there
has not been progress in determining the elements of a deep seabed
mining convention essential to acceptability by the United States
and others interested in promoting the conservation and orderly
development of the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed.
Enough is known now to draft legislation which anticipates and
would gear into any convention the United States could accept.
Bills to authorize regulation of deep seabed mining by United
States companies have been introduced in both houses of the Con-
gress. 2 The proposed legislation is intended as an interim measure
to fit into and be replaced by an international regime to be estab-
lished pursuant to a multilateral convention.
The proposed legislation provides for reciprocity with countries
adopting comparable statutes. This would be accomplished by pro-
hibiting persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
from encroaching upon mining activities of nationals of other
states carried on under similar regulations which would require
respect for mining activities authorized by the United States.
Notwithstanding adoption of comparable legislation by a signifi-
cant number of ocean mining countries, the need for a generally
agreed international regime to regulate the activities of the na-
tionals of all countries would continue. National legislation even
with widespread reciprocity is at best a stopgap. Such legislation
could, however, discourage disorderly development and would
hopefully forestall claims of prior rights based upon unregulated
activities-claims which could add to the difficulties of setting up
an international regime.
2. S. 2801 and H.R. 13904, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) and HI.R. 9 and
S. 1134, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Text reprinted at 461, infra.
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Resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
have disapproved of claims of sovereignty by any state over any
portion of the ocean's floor beneath the high seas, that is, beyond
territorial waters.3 This does not give assurance that some states
may not assert that activities they or their national have carried on
conferred a priority of right to continue those activities to the ex-
clusion of all others. Pending agreement by a substantial number
of nations, it is desirable that those states having the capability to
carry on deep seabed mining by agreement or parallel action put
reasonable restraints upon themselves and their nationals that en-
courage activity but do not permit assertion of rights beyond those
necessary to assure progress, equity and order in ocean develop-
ment.
Recognizing this, a number of students of the problem have sug-
gested that, pending agreement on a permanent international
regime, there be agreement on an interim regime. That would, of
course, be the best solution. So far, however, there have been no
signs that broad agreement could be reached on an interim regime
any earlier than on the permanent regime. The thought has been
expressed that the likelihood of enactment of legislation such as
that introduced in the Congress might provide the necessary incen-
tive to reach early agreement on the international regime.
While the pendency of the proposed legislation did appear to
have encouraged some delegates in the Seabed Committee to get
down to business at Geneva this past summer, it provoked other
to turn from agreement on orderly development to agreement by
those lacking the capability to engage through their own nationals
in deep seabed mining to prohibit mining by those having the
capability (the "Moratorium Declaration"). 4  The prospects that
3. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) (1972). The text of this and related resolu-
tions of the General Assembly, as well as many other documents bearing
on the law of the sea and seabed, are collected in S. ODA, Tim INTFNATioNAL
LAw or THE OcEAN DEVELOPMENT (1972), [hereinafter cited as ODA].
4. The Moratorium Declaration was sponsored by the following thir-
teen states: Algeria, Brazil, Chile, China, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Arab Re-
public, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Yemen and Yugoslavia. It was feared
that these states would call for a fresh moratorium resolution in the 1972
session of the General Assembly. This was not done. The State De-
partment found this a favorable omen. The Acting Legal Adviser on
March 1, 1973 wrote Senator Fulbright:
One other significant development at this General Assembly,
fortunately in keeping with the spirit that dominated the nego-
the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., West Germany, Japan, France or
the United States5 would agree not to engage in seabed mining
until a permanent regime has been established are equal to the
prospects that the sponsors of the moratorium declaration would
enter into an interim agreement promoting orderly development
before the permanent regime is set up. In each case the chances are
nil.
The sponsors of the moratorium declaration include states that
believe it to be to their benefit-if not to the benefit of mankind as
a whole-to keep the hard minerals which are found on the seabed
off the market as long as possible. The longer they can accomplish
this the longer they can enjoy increasing profits from the growing
demand for, and the diminishing supply of, land-based minerals.
Progress toward a permanent solution will be fostered by con-
vincing those delegates who have been blocking progress that
mining activity is not going to be retarded by moratorium declara-
tions or by dilatory tactics in the Seabed Committee meetings or
by insisting upon an international regime known to be unacceptable
to metals-consuming countries. The mining activity can be orderly
or chaotic. It would appear to be of genuine benefit to mankind
for all to support timely negotiating progress and reasonable interim
regulation-not futile prohibition. And it is to the interest of all
tiation of the Conference Resolution, was the fact that no new
resolution calling for a moratorium on deep seabed activities was
introduced. While it would not be accurate to interpret this as an
indication that States supporting the earlier moratorium resolu-
tion have changed their opinion, we believe that the avoidance of
a renewed and divisive debate on this subject was related to the
general attempts to ensure the best possible atmosphere as we
enter the final stage of preparatory work this year. Needless to
say, our own opposition to the moratorium remains unchanged.
5. The President and the State Department have repeatedly stated
that the United States adhered for itself and its nationals to the principle of
freedom of the high seas. The noteworthy May, 1970, announcement of
the President stated:
... the negotiation of such a complex treaty may take some time.
I do not, however, believe it is either necessary or desirable to try
to halt exploration and exploitation of the seabeds beyond a depth
of 200 meters during the negotiating process.
ODA, supra note 3, at 344. As late as March 1, 1973, the Acting Legal Ad-
viser stated in a letter to Senator Fulbright:
Moreover, we wish to repeat that we continue to adhere to the
President's statement that it is neither necessary nor desirable to
try to halt exploration and exploitation of the seabeds beyond a
depth of 200 meters during the negotiating process, provided that
such activities are subject to the international regime to be agreed
upon, which should include due protection of the integrity of in-
vestment made in the interim period. Our opposition to H.R. 9
in no way alters this.
[Hereinafter cited as March 1973 statement],
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for those states that want the activity orderly and the regulations
reasonable to lead the way without further delay.
For those who sense that legislation of the kind now before the
Congress could prejudice installation of an international regime of
benefit to mankind as a whole, the constructive course to pursue is
to point out what regulation would be better than that proposed.
The critics thus far have revealed a lack of understanding of its
reach which calls for a simple statement of what it does and what it
does not do.
The proposed legislation now before the Congress (called here-
after the "interim bill") authorizes regulation under which persons
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States will be required to
1) obtain a license before engaging in mining of the deep
seabed;
2) refrain from mining in areas not covered by their licenses;
3) observe in their mining operations regulations designed to
protect
a) the marine environment,
b) other uses of the sea, including prospecting and mining
by persons not subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States in the very areas in which they are licensed to
mine.
Contrary to the apprehensions of some, the interim bill does not
1) purport to claim any territorial jurisdiction over any area of
the deep seabed;6
2) confer any rights as against any national other than one
under the jurisdiction of the United States;
3) contemplate regulations for protection of the environment
less stringent than would be a part of the multilateral convention
on the deep seabed.
One critic has assumed that the interim bill is comparable to the
Truman Proclamation.7 In fact, the two have nothing in common.
6. The Administration understands that the interim bills before
Congress, the first of which was S. 2801, do not claim any territorial
jurisdiction over any area of the seabed but have stated it is appar-
ent that S. 2801 (now H.R. 9), independent of the particular con-
tents or merits of the Bill, has become a symbol to many coun-
tries of defiance of the multilateral negotiating process.
Letter of the Acting Legal Adviser to Senator Fulbright, June 1, 1972.
This misunderstanding by some of our foreign friends has been fostered
by like misunderstanding of some of our own citizens, including our
friend Professor H. Gray Knight. See companion article in this issue.
7. The Proclamation issued 28 September 1945 stated:
Truman claimed exclusive rights to continental shelf resources.
The interim bill which is concerned with activities beyond the legal
continental shelf makes no territorial or other claims to the exclu-
sion of any foreign state or its nationals. All states and their na-
tionals retain throughout the high seas their present freedoms, in-
cluding the freedom to mine. The only persons subject to regulation
by the United States are persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.
Although President Nixon in his announcement of May 23, 1970,
called for establishment of an interim policy, the Administration
has yet to put forward its proposals for implementation.8 The in-
terim bill was worked out at the Senate Interior Committee's
request by a Committee of the American Mining Congress. Why,
one asks, should the mining industry ask to be regulated. Any
mining company that wants to recover nodules from the bottom of
the high seas is now free to do so. No license is required, yet the
industry advocates that it be prohibited from mining the nodules to
be found on the surface of the seabed except under a license and in
accordance with regulations to be issued by the Secretary of the
Interior. The reason industry wants legislation is that the invest-
ment required for mining in commercially profitable quantities at
depths of as much as 15,000 feet, and for reducing the minerals
recovered to saleable copper, nickel and cobalt, is of such a magni-
The Government of the United States regards the natural resources
of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coast of the United States as apper-
taining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.
ODA, supra note 3, at 341.
8. The March 1973 statement discloses a sense of obligation to prepare
legislation to implement the President's policy. It states:
In reporting to you that the Administration is opposed to the
enactment of H.R. 9, we want to make clear that this does not
mean we are unalterably opposed to legislation of any sort, or that
we intend to disregard the problem of interim mining. Any of a
number of events could occur that would lead us to conclude that
legislation was necessary, and we intend to prepare as quickly as
possible for that contingency.
Prudence dictates that we also begin at once to formulate a
legislative approach on a contingency basis for two reasons. First,
it could conceivably become clear during the negotiations that we
have no reasonable basis for expecting a timely and successful law
of the Sea Conference. Second, we can prepare for privisional
entry into force of some aspects of the international seabed regime
once it is signed. While the approach in H.R. 9 does not appear
to us to be satisfactory, we intend to continue the useful dis-
cussions we have been having with industry representatives and
members of the public on this issue with a view to formulating
such an approach within the Administration.
Similarly, we have had interesting discussions of this problem
with other nations.
March 1973 Statement, supra note 5.
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tude that long-term financing in the hundreds of millions of dollars
is essential. The banks that have been approached have indicated
a willingness to lend the required amounts only after there is legis-
lation along the lines proposed.
The proposed interim legislation provides safeguards against
three risks, namely losses in recoverable mineral resources result-
ing from:
1) encroachment by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.
The safeguard on this is that all such persons are forbidden to
mine in the mining area except the company licensed to operate
there.
2) encroachment by persons not subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States.
a) Here the risk of loss is minimized by the program for recip-
rocal protection. Persons not subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States but subject to that of states with comparable legis-
lation will be forbidden by their own governments to mine in an
area under a license previously issued by the United States or
other reciprocating state. There is reason to believe that as a
practical matter every country whose nationals are interested in
and capable of deep seabed mining will, out of self-interest, pro-
hibit their nationals from encroaching into an area under such a
license in return for application of the reciprocity provisions of the
proposed statute. It will, as previously indicated, forbid U.S. na-
tionals from encroaching into an area under license by a recipro-
cating state.
b) As to encroachment by nationals of non-reciprocating states,
the proposed statute provides for OPIC-type insurance. Inasmuch
as there is reason to believe that the companies with the capabil-
ity of deep seabed mining will be nationals of reciprocating states
and so forbidden to encroach, no matter by which state they are
licensed, the chances of losses for which insurance benefits are
payable will be minimal The premiums for this insurance not
paid out as benefits could be paid into the fund of the interna-
tional authority when established for distribution for the benefit of
mankind, particularly the lesser developed countries. In the view
of the author, possibly all of the amount paid in as premiums, less
only administration expenses, would thus be available for distri-
bution once the international authority has power itself to forbid
encroachment by the nationals of any state.
c) Limitation on the right of recovery by, or increased burdens
imposed pursuant to, the multilateral convention.
The coverage for this OPIC-type insurance, which would be
written by a government agency, would include losses attributable
to
-limitation on the amount of recovery below a level fixed in
the interim license by reason of subsequent:
- shortening of the period covered by the license;
- interruption of production in the licensed area;
- relocation of that area;
- limitation in the annual rate of recovery;
- limitation in the annual rate of sale or price of the constituent
metals;
- increase in the charges payable by the miner.
Here again the risk of loss by the insurer is within its power to
limit. The United States is able now to anticipate to a considerable
degree the kind of multilateral convention it would be willing to
accept. The regulations under the interim bills could be drafted
now to fit into the regulations in and under the multilateral con-
vention. The variations, if any, are likely to be minor and not
costly. Any premiums not required to be paid out could, less
administrative expenses, be turned over to the fund for distribution
for the benefit of mankind, particularly the people of the developing
countries.
One could argue with the bankers that given the smallness of the
risk, they should not insist on the insurance. Their answer is that
venturing into an activity so unprecedented as deep seabed mining
is itself so risky from a nonpolitical angle that there should not be
added the risks discussed above, all to a large degree of a political
nature.
It should be noted that U.S. companies will be competing with
companies that are state owned, as in the case of a Russian agency
of government, or state subsidized, as in the case with companies in
West Germany and Japan.
Why do the governments of these countries encourage deep sea-
bed mining? The answer to this question is for them the same as
it is to the question why the United States should insure its nation-
als against offshore political risks. All are industrial countries, for
the most part net importers of copper, nickel and cobalt. The
reliability of their and our traditional land-based sources of supply
is diminishing as the requirements for industrial and strategic pur-
poses are increasing. It is to their interest, as it is to ours and the
interest of most countries, developed or lesser developed, to make
available the resources of the deep seabed. The risk of expropria-
tion or failure of reliable production through political unrest does
not hang, as a sword of Damocles, over the marine sources of sup-
ply.
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So far as is known, no U.S. company has asked its government to
subsidize its deep seabed mining operations as other governments
are doing. The request for insuring-in contrast to subsidizing-is
modest and it is in better keeping with the American free enter-
prise competitive system. It is not believed that with the increasing
world demand the added supply from the ocean floors will lower
prices, but there is a real possibility that without the marine-based
supplies the price of the land-based supplies will rise. That, as has
been mentioned, appears to be the hope of some ore exporting
nations and their reason for obstructing agreement on a workable
international regime. If copper, nickel and cobalt prices can be
kept reasonable, the cost to the American taxpayer of insurance
that will help assure marine-based supplies at reasonable prices will
be more than offset by the savings in the cost of those metals which
enter into the manufactured products every consumer buys.
A question sometimes put is this. If legislation such as is pro-
posed is enacted by the United States and the other nations having
the capability of recovering deep seabed nodules and of separating
the basic metals, will not the incentive for them to promote a multi-
national convention be lessened. If it is assumed that the program
of reciprocity between the industrial advanced nations will prove
to be so satisfactory to them that they cease to push for an early
multilateral convention on the seabed, there is reason to believe
that those countries whose delegates have obstructed agreement
on a workable international regime will change course 180 degrees
and themselves push for early agreement on a regime acceptable
to the industrial nations-on a regime that is truly to the benefit of
all of mankind-not the least to the consumers in nations that im-
port the metals to be made available for their own growing indus-
trial needs or in consumer products into which these metals enter.
Administration spokesmen have recently urged the Congress to
refrain from enacting interim legislation provided the following
schedule is adhered to:
Meetings of the Seabed Committee in March and July-August
1973, preparing for an organizational Law of the Sea Conference in
November-December 1973, and a Substantive Meeting of the Con-
ferende in April-May 1974, with a possible further conference to
complete a Convention in 1974 or 1975.
The implication was strong that the Administration would not
oppose some sort of interim legislation if agreement was not reached
prior to the General Assembly session in the fall of 1975.0 This
has been followed up by a proposal in the Seabed Committee by the
United States delegate that consideration be given to a provisional
international regime effective from the date of signature of the
Multilateral Convention for a permanent regime until the necessary
ratifications have been deposited.10 The Seabed Committee has
asked the Secretary General to prepare for the July-August meet-
ing a report on precedents for such a provisional regime."
This is all right so far as it goes but it counts too heavily on ad-
herence to the schedule 1973-1975. The lack of progress to the end
of March in the Seabed Committee lends little to support confidence
in agreement in 1975 or for years thereafter. The position does
have the merit of strengthening earlier statements suggesting that
the nations wanting agreement will go ahead with one arrangement
or another if the present lack of progress continues.1 2
In hearings following the Administration's March 1973 statement
of its position and the delegate's provisional arrangement proposal,
former Secretary of State Dean Rusk on March 27, 1973, testified:
We face the possibility, if I may use the phrase in these halls,
of a filibuster by the developing countries which might unfortu-
nately postpone indefinitely a generally agreed international re-
gime with respect to the resources of international seas. I per-
sonally feel that the long-range outlook for vital resources is so
serious that we should make it clear than an indefinite postpone-
ment is not acceptable. Perhaps the dozen or more countries who
are now developing the technology for such exploitation should,
9. The March 1973 statement explained:
Let me be quite clear about the timing of this course of action.
First, we will commence work on alternative approaches immedi-
ately, and will concentrate on the period between signature and
entry into force of the treaty; second, we will want to make a
continuing assessment of the negotiations to determine if a timely
and successful Conference will occur; and third, we will not ask
Congress to pass alternative legislation for the period before the
conclusion of the Conference if a timely and successful Conference
is predictable.
Let me also be clear as to what we mean by a "timely and
successful" Conference. We would not regard a Conference as
timely unless the schedule referred to in the preamble of the Con-
ference Resolution is adhered to: in other words, a Convention,
including arrangements regarding the provisional application of
the international seabeds regime, would be opened for signature in
1974 or, at the latest, in 1975. In practical terms, this means not
later than the summer of 1975, since many delegates would have to
be present when the U.N. General Assembly convenes in Septem-
ber. Id.
10. Statement of the United States Delegate to the U.N. Seabed Com-
mittee, March 19, 1973.
.11. Resolution adopted March 26, 1973. Technically the resolution was
by a subcommittee of the whole which requires, and is assured of, approval
by the same members in a plenary meeting.
12. See note 8 supra.
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in that event, get together and make their own arrangements
among themselves with due regard for the legitimate interests of
the developing countries. I make it clear that this is my personal
opinion and should not be interpreted as reflecting any views I
have heard expressed by the Executive Branch of our Govern-
ment.13
Professor L.F.E. Goldie in other hearings on the day following
Secretary Rusk's testimony submitted a scholarly paper giving
precedents for states and their nationals to acquire mining rights on
the ocean floor under existing international law which they could
exercise outside of a conventional international regime or could use
to gain special rights under the regime on the basis of a "grand-
father clause."'-4 Further procrastination by the Congress in mak-
ing it possible for American private enterprise to compete on the
ocean floor with foreign state supported enterprises could work to
the disadvantage of United States public interests. He made it clear
that he did not advocate the assertion of those rights by the Con-
gress and that the proposed interim legislation does not make or
support such an assertion.
My esteemed colleague whose article appears with this associates
himself with those who have stated that the interim bill now before
the Congress "does not best serve the resource management in-
terests of the United States as a whole." Some of the writers he
cites take this position because of certain mining provisions with
which they do not agree. This is not the place to discuss those
issues as we are concerned here with the international aspects. I
cannot believe he believes the interests of the United States on the
international plane will be served by jeopardizing availability of
the source of supply of minerals to the United States of which it
is a net importer and by worsening our adverse trade balance.
13. Hearings on S. Res. 82 Before the Senate Subcomm. on International
Organizations and Movements, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), a resolution
introduced by Senator Pell commending the United States delegation to
the Seabed Committee "for its excellent work" The resolution also
endorses the objectives envisioned in the President's "ocean policy statement
of May 23, 1970."
14. Testimony before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, Subcommittee on Oceanography, March 28, 1973. Dr. Goldie
has assembled an impressive array of precedents for the acquisition of
mining rights in terra nu~lius, the outstanding one being the case of the
island of Spitsbergen before any state claimed sovereignty over it and
the retention of those rights under the "grandfather clause" principle
The effect of enactment now of interim legislation on the nego-
tiations in the Seabed Committee is a matter of conjecture on which
reasonable men can and do disagree. Professor Knight's judgment
that it would be adverse is shared by the Administration. The
writer's judgment is supported by the general principle that "faint
heart ne'r won fair lady" or that it is the timid two are frightened
by the barks that get the bites. That the pendency of the interim
bills has had a beneficial effect seems self evident. The Adminis-
tration acknowledges this.
It "contravenes international expectations," Professor Knight
states. Fine lawyer that he is, he does not join those writers who
say it violates existing rights. The expectations of some it does
contravene, and properly so. Those countries that have expected
to deny to mankind the benefits of seabed resources by insisting on
a moratorium to be followed by an unworkable international au-
thority are bound to be disappointed.
That the United States has already contravened these expectations
is evidenced by the following statement made by the United States
delegate to the Seabed Committee on August 10, 1972:
The views of my delegation on resource issues have also been
stated on a number of occasions. Unfortunately, some delegations
appear to have the impression that maritime countries in general,
and the United States in particular, can be expected to sacrifice
in these negotiations basic elements of their national policy on re-
sources. This is not true. The reality is that every nation repre-
sented here has basic interests in both resource and non-resource
uses that require accommodation.
Accordingly, we believe it is important to dispel any possible
misconceptions that my government would agree to a monopoly
by an international operating agency over deep seabed exploita-
tion or to any type of economic zone that does not accommodate
basic United States interests with respect to resources as well as
navigation.15
Our area of agreement can be enlarged with continuing exchange
of views. For instance, an interim measure enacted this year could
limit actual exploitation to a period after 1975 and then only if no
multilateral agreement had been reached. This would not hurt the
development of our recovery capabilities since the earliest that
commercial production could begin, if the law were enacted and the
necessary financing assured today, would be after 1975. The legisla-
tion is needed now because of the long "lead time" necessary to
build the ships and recovery equipment and land-based treatment
when Norway claimed sovereignty and the United States and others recog-
nized the claim.
15. Statement of United States Delegate to the U.N. Seabed Committee,
August 10, 1972.
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plants. Exploration could go forward under regulations which
anticipated the provisions of a Convention the United States could
support. With the signature of a Convention the regulations of
the Secretary of the Interior would be made consistent with it, thus
implementing a provisional regime such as the United States dele-
gate has proposed.
Whatever disagreements remain between Professor Knight and
this writer, we join in subscribing to the lawyers' friendly ad-
versary process as the method best suited to assist others in reach-
ing their own conclusions. This not only gives the reader a choice
but also may lead to suggestions for better alternatives. To pro-
mote responsiveness to our points of disagreement we have ex-
changed early drafts of these companion articles. If we have failed
to meet each other head-on it is not for lack of trying.
